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THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE TO RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
The public policy defense to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
has been considered the greatest single threat to the use of arbitration in
international commercial disputes. Courts and commentators alike have
expressed misgivings over this potential "loophole" in binding international commercial arbitration.1 These misgivings are based on the ease
with which a court might disregard a foreign arbitral award for virtually
any reason, however persuasive, simply by finding that enforcement of
the award would conflict with the public policy of the forum. Such
action by courts would undermine the arbitral award enforcement
process, and weaken international commercial arbitration as a method
of dispute settlement.
The 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards 2 (Convention) was the culmination of the
rapid evolution of international support for the use of commerical
arbitration. 3 Although the Convention was a significant step in recognition of international commercial arbitration, states nevertheless insisted
on maintaining their ultimate, sovereign control over recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 4 The bases upon which a
signatory state may refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award were
enumerated in article V of the Convention, with the public policy
i. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); Kitigawa, Contractual
Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 132,
139 (P. Sanders ed. 1967); Comment, UnitedNations ArbitralAwards Convention, United
States Accession, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 67, 81 (1971); Straus, Arbitration of Disputes
Between Multinational Corporations, 24 ARB. J. 228, 233-34 (1968).
2. 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959); 21 U.S.T. 2517; T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Convention].
3. For a brief history of the development of international commercial arbitration,
see Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049-059 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Quigley].
4. It follows from the fact that the power to enforce awards ultimately belongs
to the state that, acting through the courts, the state must have authority to
scrutinize at any time the lawfulness of an arbitration award. Law enforcement
is no longer a private matter in any civilized community. If, acting through its
agents, public authority is to enforce arbitration awards, public authority must
also be in a position to check on the foundations and limitations of arbitration.
Schwab, Legal Foundations and Limitations of Arbitration Procedures in the U.S. and
Germany, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 301, 307 (P. Sanders ed. 1967) [hereinafter

cited as Schwab].
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defense included as one of two defenses which may be raised ex officio
5
by a court of the state requested to enforce an award.
Since the United States' accession to the Convention in 1970,6
United States courts have had to consider this "loophole" threat to the
future of binding arbitration under the Convention. In doing so, the
courts have measurably affected the definition, nature, and use of the
public policy defense. This comment will analyze the present definition
and status of the public policy defense to enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards in the United States, point out some resultant problems, and
briefly describe a model under which the public policy defense would
assume clearer meaning and greater usefulness.
I.

DEFINITION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE

The first important multilateral definition 7 of the public policy
defense found in formal rules governing international commercial
arbitration was set forth in the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 8 Article I of that convention provided
for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award only if
the award was "not contrary to the public policy or to the principles of
9
the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon."
In drafting a new convention on recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards in 1955, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations adopted the basic definition of
°
the public policy defense stated in the 1927 Geneva Convention.'
However, the 1958 New York Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration 1 later modified that definition for the final Convention
draft. The Conference intended that the change would strengthen
5. Convention art. V (2)(b). The other defense that can be raised by a court ex
officio is the defense of non-arbitrable subject matter. Id. art. V (2)(a). See text
accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
6. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 89-25,84 Stat. 692,9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). The
instrument of accession was filed September 30, 1970, and came into effect December 29,
1970.
7. Post-World War II bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
give only an unelucidating statement that arbitral awards will be enforced between two
states "except where found contrary to public policy." See Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (1954);
Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (1953); and Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No.
3057 (1951).
8. 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (1928).
9. Id. art. I (e) at 305.
10. 19 U.N. ESCOR (12th mtg.), U.N. Doc. No. E/AC. 42/SR. 12/7 (1955).
11. For a discussion of the New York Conference, see G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON
THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS; U.S. DEL. REP.

(1958) [hereinafter cited as HAIGHT].
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international commercial arbitration by limiting "the scope of the public
policy clause as far as possible." ' 12 Nevertheless, the Conference
recognized the necessity of including the public policy clause as a
''catch-all" provision which would permit varied applications of the
public policy defense within the many states.1 3 The final wording of the
Convention stated simply that a country may refuse to recognize or
enforce a foreign arbitral award if "the recognition or enforcement of
the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." 14
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, when
first called on to interpret the Convention's provision for a public policy
defense in the case of Parsons& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
GeneraleDeL 'IndustrieDu Papier[RAKTA] 5 (Overseas), found that
the legislative history of the provision offered no certain guidelines to its
construction. 16 Instead the court examined the defense in the historical
context of the Convention as a whole. 17 The court determined that "a
narrow reading of the public policy defense" 18 should be applied to the
factual situation of the case to reflect the general pro-enforcement bias
informing the Convention, 19 and to prevent the development of a major
loophole in the Convention mechanism for enforcement. 20 The opinion
in Overseas expressed a narrow construction of the public policy
defense in these words:
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this
basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state's
21
most basic notions of morality and justice.
12. 2 P. SANDERS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 323 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SANDERS]; Contini, InternationalCommercialArbitration,8 AM. J. COMP. L.
283, 304, (1959); but see Quigley, supra note 3, at 1071-071; Comment, United Nations
ForeignArbitralAwards Convention: UnitedStatesAccession, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 67,
81(1971).
13. HAIGHT, supra note 1I, at 68; Aksen, American ArbitrationAccession Arivesin
the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 13 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Aksen]; Quigley, supra note 3, at 1071 n.93.
14. Convention art. V (2)(b). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7):
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter....
15. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
16. Id. at 973. The facts and ruling of this case are treated in the text accompanying
notes 31-35, 77-82 infra.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id at 974.
21. Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to note the similarity between the court's
narrow construction of public policy, i.e. the "most basic notions of morality and
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These definitions of the public policy defense, being of an
extremely generic, unspecific nature, offer little guidance for a practical
understanding or pleading of the defense. In order to obtain a clearer
understanding of the public policy defense, a supplementary examination will be made of those defenses which are closely related to, but not
actually part of the public policy defense.
A. Similar But Separate Defenses
In addition to the public policy defense, there are several other
defenses which United States courts have founded on basic considerations of morality and justice. These defenses to enforcement of arbitral
awards are pleaded on a basis of: 1) procedural due process; 2)
non-arbitrable subject matter; 3) manifest disregard of the law by
arbitrators; 4) forum non con veniens; or 5) a conflict with United States
national policy or domestic law. The following sections will discuss
these, and note how they are considered as defenses separate from the
public policy defense, or how, for practical reasons, it is unlikely that
these defenses would succeed if pleaded as examples of the public
policy defense.
1. ProceduralDue Process. Public policy requirements of fundamental fairness in arbitration include "proper notice" and "opportunity to be heard.' 22 Not only are these imperative elements of the
United States concept of due process, but they are also required to
maintain the credibility and desirability of arbitration in the eyes of
businessmen. 23 This policy is reflected in article V (1)(b) of the
Convention which specifically provides for refusal of recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award when "the party against whom
the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of
the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case." 24 Under this separate provision, the defense of
procedural due process is no longer pleaded as a protection of public
policy.
An example of procedural due process being considered as separate
justice," and the Ad Hoc Committee draft definition of public policy which was rejected
as too broad, i.e. "fundamental principles of law."
22.

See generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

§ 24.01 (1968).
23. But see Gilbert v. Burstein, 225 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706(1931) in which the New
York Court of Appeals enforced an award against a New Yorker who had submitted to
arbitration under the British Arbitration Act, even though he had not appeared or been
served in the United Kingdom.
24. Convention art. V (1)(b).
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from the public policy defense appeared in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal
Co.2 5 The litigants had submitted a commercial dispute to arbitration in
Japan 26 when Fotochrome, before having presented all its witnesses,
went into bankruptcy in New York. The referee in bankruptcy issued a
stay which Fotochrome understood to forbid continued arbitration.
However, the arbitral tribunal in Japan ruled that the stay was not
effective as to its proceedings; it concluded the arbitration without
Fotochrome's presence, and granted an award to the Japanese firm,
Copal. When Copal presented the award as a judgment claim 27 against
the debtor in the bankruptcy court, Fotochrome challenged enforcement
of the award under the Convention by asserting inter alia28 that it had
been "unable" to present its case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, without reaching
a "public policy" issue, that Fotochrome, in effect, had been able to
present its case because the bankruptcy court stay extended to creditors
of the debtor and not to the debtor itself.29 The court also held that while
Copal may have been a creditor, it was not enjoined from continuing
arbitration since it did not fall under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.3 0 In sum, the appellate court decided the matter through an analysis
of procedural due process protections only, without finding it necessary
to discuss the more general public policy considerations of morality and
justice.
The appellant in Parsons& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
GeneraleDe L "IndustrieDu Papier[RAKTA]31 also claimed that it had
been "unable to present its case before an arbitral tribunal." The
tribunal had refused to postpone hearings so that a witness who had a
25. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
26. For a discussion of Japanese arbitration see Doi, International Commercial
Arbitration in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 66-77 (P. Sanders ed. 1968);
Kawakami & Henderson, Arbitrationin U.S./JapaneseSales Disputes, 42 WASH. L. REV.
541 (1967).

27. The award was not made exequaturin a court proceeding at which Fotochrome
could have appealed the award. The arbitral award was recognized as a final and
conclusive judgment under article 800 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure and
then brought before the Bankruptcy Court. The award was not recognized as a foreign

money judgment in New York under the procedure in CPLR §§ 5301-09 because of Copal's
apparent belief that the Bankruptcy Court's stay prevented them from proceeding for
enforcement. 517 F.2d at 515.
28. Fotochrome also pleaded that if Copal's claim were permitted before the
Bankruptcy Court, foreign creditors would have an advantage over United States
creditors. Also at issue was the choice of the Convention or New York law as the
applicable law. See Note, JudicialInterpretationsof Foreign ArbitralAwards Under the
U.N. Convention, 8 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 737, 749-62 (1976).
29. 517 F.2d at 516; in other words, Fotochrome was under no legal incapacity; see
Quigley, supra note 3, at 1067.
30. 517 F.2d at 516.
31. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
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conflicting speaking engagement could give oral testimony. Counsel for
Overseas contended 32 that this was tantamount to rendering the company unable to present its case because critical information not emphasized in the affidavit, subsequently was found to be important, and
would have been brought to the tribunal's attention if the witness had
been able to give personal testimony. 33 The court pointed out that the

"inability to produce one's witness before an arbitral tribunal is a risk
inherent in an agreement to submit to arbitration,' 34 and that the arbitral
tribunal had acted within its discretion in refusing to postpone the
hearings. 35 Public policy was not expressed as a factor affecting the
court's consideration of this procedural due process issue.
In Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete v. Medford Medical
Instrument Co. ,36 the respondent, in attempting to invoke article V
(1)(b), argued that it had been "unable to present its case" not because it
had been absent from the arbitration proceedings, but because the
arbitral tribunal had given the award before the rights and liabilities of
the respondent had matured under the agreement in question. 3 7 The
court's analysis limited the requirements of article V (1)(b) to basic
questions of procedural due process. 38 Under these standards the court
32. Brief for Appellant at 24-29, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. The tribunal heid Overseas liable for damages after a certain date; the witness'
testimony allegedly could have shown that the date set by the tribunal was not an accurate
measurement of liability. Id. at 27.
34. 508 F.2d at 975. In the next sentence the court asserted:
By agreeing to submit disputes to arbitration, a party relinquishes his courtroom
rights-including that to subpoena witnesses-in favor of arbitration "with all
its well known advantages and drawbacks." Washington-Baltimore Newspaper
Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post Co., 143 U.S. App. D.C. 210,442 F.2d
1234, 1238 (1971).
Id.
35. 508 F.2d at 976. It is noteworthy that while the court treated the public policy
defense separately from the procedural due process question, it nevertheless analyzed the
hearing postponement in terms of "fundamental fairness to Overseas." Id.
36. 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
37. By virtue of two agreements, Medford had exclusive United States distribution
rights to Biotronik's products. Biotronik exercised its right to terminate the agreement at
the end of its term, and appointed another firm, Concept, Inc., to be the new distributor in
the United States. Medford asserted that a third agreement was made by which it would
receive a percentage commission on the next two years' sales of Biotronik products, as
consideration for helping Concept, Inc. become established in the United States market.
Evidence of this third agreement was not introduced by Biotronik at the arbitration.
Medford alleged that this resulted in an award procured by fraud. Moreover, because the
arbitration was concluded before the term of the third agreement had expired, Medford
argued that its rights and liabilities under the agreement could not be calculated. Id. at
135-36, 137.
38. Id. at 140.
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was able to dismiss this plea by noting that the respondent had received
notice of the arbitration proceedings. 39 The decision held that an
interpretation of article V (1)(b) which goes beyond the basic procedural
due process concerns of notice and opportunity to be heard, "misconceives the thrust of the exception."4° The court's reasoning establishes
that the procedural due process defense of article V (1)(b) has specific
application and will not be treated under the more general considerations
41
of the public policy defense.
2. Non-Arbitrable Subject Matter. In the United States, arbitration in certain matters has been held violative of public policy, and
therefore, not enforceable by the courts. 42 The Convention has provided
for this same bar to arbitration, but in a defense separate from the public
policy defense. Article V (2)(a) provides:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The
subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country.
The 1958 Conference questioned whether the addition of this
section was necessary since this consideration usually fell within public
policy definitions. The separate provision was mainly the historical
product of like treatment in the 1927 Geneva Convention, the International Chamber of Commerce Draft, and the 1955 Ad Hoc Committee
Draft. 4 3

The similarity between this defense and the public policy defense is
evidenced by the court's decision in Overseas. Even though the
defenses were dealt with separately, both were given a narrow interpretation reflective of deference to international considerations 44 and the
pro-enforcement bias of the Convention. 45 Although the defenses share
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In addition, these three cases give some indication that article V (I)(b) probably
will not be viewed by the courts with any more favor than is the public policy defense.
42. Examples of such subject matter are antitrust violations, American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), and patent disputes,
Belkman Institute v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970). See
generally DOMKE, supra note 22, at ch. 13. For a comparison of non-arbitrable subject
matter in France, see Evans & Ellis, International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 17, 34 (1973).
43. SANDERS, supra note 12, at 323.
44. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du
Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
45. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra. The court limited "non-arbitrability"
to those categories of claims having a "special national interest in judicial, rather than
arbitrable, resolution of the . . . claim underlying the award." 508 F.2d at 975.
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similar origins and judicial treatment, the defense of non-arbitrable
subject matter now has particularized application and no longer falls
under the more general rubric of public policy.
3. "Manifest Disregard"of the Law by Arbitrators.The United
States Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan ,46 stated that "interpretations of
the law by arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregardare not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." 47 This
statement resulted in a new, freshly phrased defense to enforcement of
arbitral awards called "manifest disregard of the law."
Because the Supreme Court offered no elaboration on the Wilko
statement of "manifest disregard," it was necessary for the lower
federal courts to give definitive substance to the defense. The "manifest
disregard" defense was raised in San Maritime CompaniaDe Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals," when the appellee attacked the arbitral
tribunal's award based on activities which the appellee claimed were not
in violation of the litigants' charter agreement. The court held that the
tribunal's interpretation of the scope of the agreement did not constitute
a manifest disregard of the law. The court noted that "manifest
disregard of the law must be something beyond and different from a
mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand
or apply the law;" 4 9 rather, "manifest disregard" is present "when
arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to
50
disregard the same."
The case of Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher5 1 clarified
another dimension of the developing concept of the "manifest disregard" defense. The decision extended the contextual application of the
defense by holding that an award may be disturbed "when there is a
manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles
of contract construction and the law of the shop." 5 2 Honold further
46. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
47. Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
48. 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
49. Id.at 801.
50. Id., accord, Bell Aerospace v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354 (W.D.N.Y.1973);
Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. La. 1971); Sobel v.
Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
51. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
52. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). This notion of "manifest disregard of the agreement" may have been at least implicitly part of the San Maritime decision also since both
cases drew on the authority of United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960): "[An arbitrator] may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this
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established that a test of "fundamental rationality" will accompany an
examination of whether an arbitrator's award represents a manifest
53
disregard of law.

In spite of the fact that the "manifest disregard" defense involves
certain basic notions of morality and justice, it is doubtful that a showing
of "manifest disregard" would be applied as a defense under the general
definition of the public policy defense in objections to enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award. 54 This is not so because the defense already has a
separate definition or a specific context for its application, but rather,
because it is unlikely that a defense of "manifest disregard" would be
appropriate to an examination of a foreign arbitral award. There are two
reasons to support such a conclusion. First, it is not known how a court
would be able to determine if an arbitrator had understood and nevertheless disregarded the law, in light of the fact that an arbitrator usually is
not required to state the reasoning behind his award. 5
Obviously, a requirement that arbitrators explain their
reasoning in every case would help to uncover egregious
failures to apply the law to an arbitrated dispute. But such a
rule would undermine the very purpose of arbitration, which
is to provide a relatively quick, efficient and informal means
of private dispute settlement. . . . [T]he primary consideration for the courts must be that the system operate expedi56
tiously as well as fairly.

Secondly, even if a court were to have insight into the arbitrator's
reasoning, an examination of his decision might be considered tantamount to a review of the merits of the award.5 7 Insofar as review of the
merits is not allowed on domestic arbitration matters in the United States
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." See also Swift
Industries v. Botany Industries, 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972).
53. 405 F.2d at 1133. Swift Industries v. Botany Industries, 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d
Cir. 1972). But an allegation of irrationality does not force a court to inquire into the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award. Diamond v. Terminal Railway Alabama
State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. In Overseas, the two defenses were pled together by the appellant, Brief for
Appellant at 34, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie
Du Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), and separately by the appellee, Brief for
Appellee at 50-51, Parsons & Whittmore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie
Du Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), but treated separately by the court, 508
F.2d at 973, 977.
55. For suggested solutions on rules governing requirements for giving reasons
supporting an arbitral award, see Sanders, Appeals Procedurein Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 112, 123-24, 126 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1974).

56. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1969).
57. I/S Stavborg v. Nat'l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 429 (2d Cir. 1974).
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courts, 5 8 to the same extent the courts are prevented under the Convention 59 from reviewing the merits of a foreign arbitral award. 60
It is improbable that a showing of "manifest disregard" would
succeed under the public policy defense unless the award involved so
extreme an unlikelihood as the blatant, unconcealed defiance on the part
of an arbitrator for the arbitration agreement and the law. Consequently,
it is unlikely that the "manifest disregard" defense will be applied at all
to review of foreign arbitral awards. 61
4. Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Con veniens. In the
past, courts have looked with disfavor upon forum selection clauses.
Such clauses were considered as operating to "oust the jurisdiction" of
the courts, thereby violating the public policy of the forum. 62 More
recently, the United States Supreme Court in Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co.63 took a significant step64 in enforcing forum selection
clauses by treating the "ousting the jurisdiction" argument as little
more than a "vestigial legal fiction."65
Bremen was a case in which the litigants had agreed to adjudicate
in London any disputes arising out of a contract to tow a drilling rig from
Louisiana to Italy. Nevertheless, when a dispute did occur, 6 6 Zapata
brought an action for damages in a United States court in Florida. The
owner of the Bremen, Unterweser, brought an action against Zapata in
London under the forum selection clause of their contract, and moved
for dismissal in the United States court. The Supreme Court, disagreeing with the lower courts, refused to disregard the forum selection
58. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Steel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
59. Convention art. III: "There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards
to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of
domestic arbitral awards." There are also similar provisions in bilateral treaties. See e.g.,
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, art. IV par. 2,4 U.S.T. 2063,
2068, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (1953).
60.' Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1975).
61. But see, Recent Developments, 10 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 619,621 (1975); see also the
discussion in Parsons& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L 'IndustrieDu
Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974).
62. For cases holding this principle, see Annot., 56 ALR 2d 306-20 (1957), Later
Case Service (1967), (1976).
63. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
64. See generally Note, Arbitration and Forum Selection Clauses in International
Business: The Supreme Court Takes an Internationalist View, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 424
(1974).
65. 407 U.S. at 12.
66. After the drilling rig was damaged by a storm in the Gulf of Mexico, the Bremen
towed it to the nearest port in Tampa, Florida.
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clause because it was an integral part of the contract which the parties
had calculated in forming the agreement. The Court ruled "that in the
light of present day commercial realities and expanding international
trade. . . the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that
67
it should be set aside."
Zapata asserted that the London court was a forum non con veniens,
and that strong reason for setting aside the forum selection clause
therefore existed. The matter was remanded to determine if the London
forum inconvenienced a party so as to preclude the possibility of a fair
trial. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court indicated that it viewed the forum
selection clause as a part of a freely negotiated contract made at arm's
length and "unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power." 68
With the increase of international commerce and greater participation of smaller companies in international markets, the possibility of
adhesion bargaining situations, in which only one party determines the
arbitration format, becomes more distinct. If a commercially weak party
were to be forced into unreasonable or inconvenient arbitration which
effectually denied that party its day in court, a deprivation of fundamental fairness and justice would be involved. 69 Should an award arising
from such circumstances, therefore, be challenged by pleading the
public policy defense?
One reason the public policy defense might not apply, in spite of its
relation to fundamental fairness and justice, is the plausibility of raising
the alternative defense of article V (1)(b) of the Convention70 which
prevents recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if a
party has been "unable to present his case.''71 Discussion in the
Convention Conference tends to emphasize the generally inclusive
72
nature of this phrase.
67. 407 U.S. at 15. The Court also ruled that while the London court would enforce
exculpatory clauses in the contract which a United States court would not enforce, there
still was no strong showing that the forum selection clause should not control; contra Bisso
v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing
& Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963), which are cases involving no international
considerations.
68. 407 U.S. at 12, 17-18.
69. Bearing in mind that parties seldom negotiate a contract in terms of equal
bargaining power, free choice of the procedural law of arbitration could be
detrimental to the economically weaker party. It could mean choice of a law that
would let the stronger harass the weaker into an unwanted arbitration.
ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
70. See text accompanying notes 24-41 supra.
71. Convention art. V (l)(b).
72. Quigley, supra note 3, at 1067.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977

LAW PROCEEDINGS

253 (1960).

11

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1977], Art. 5
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE

Another reason for exluding forum non conveniens from the public
policy defense is that a defense of inconvenient forum, if pleaded
separately, would have an easier burden of proof. A successful claim of
inconvenient forum need only prove that the arbitration forum was
unreasonably inconvenient; 73 it need not show that the use of the forum
violated basic notions of morality and justice. If forum non conveniens
were incorporated within the public policy defense, a claim of inconvenient forum would have to reveal a violation of basic notions of morality
and justice, as well as unreasonable inconvenience . 7 1 Moreover, the
proof of unreasonableness in a claim of forum non conveniens is judged
in the context of the particular circumstances, 75 and not under the more
general and ephemeral public policy standards of fundamental notions
of morality and justice.
5. A Conflict with United States Policy or Domestic Laws.
Courts reviewing foreign arbitral awards have been confronted on
occasion with a conflict between enforcement of the foreign award and
domestic governmental policies or statutes .76
In the Overseas case,7 7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with the question of whether public policy is equatable to or
reflected in national governmental policies. The issue arose out of a
contract between Overseas, a United States based corporation, and
RAKTA, a predominantly Egyptian government-owned corporation.
The contract provided for the construction and initial management by
Overseas of a paper board mill in Egypt, with financing provided by an
agency of the United States Department of State. The mill was almost
completed when United States and Egyptian relations deteriorated on
the eve of the Six Day Arab-Israeli War. Overseas was informed by the
Department of State agency that financing of the project had been
73. Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 354 F. Supp. 571 (W.D.
Pa. 1973); see also Comment, Unterweser:Choice Not Chance in ForumClauses, 3 CALIF.
W. INT'L L.J. 397, 406-08 (1973). Note, however, that the Supreme Court considers this a
heavy burden of proof. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
74. A review of an arbitral award involving alleged fraud has held that the advantages of arbitration require a court to find a "convincing showing [of fraud or undue
influence] before upsetting an international arbitration award." Biotronik Mess-und
Therapiergeraete v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J.
1976). "The award... must stand unless it is made abundantly clear that it was obtained
through 'corruption, fraud or undue means.' " Id. citing Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer
Machine Co., 187 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1951).
75. Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 354 F. Supp. 571 (W.D.
Pa. 1973).
76. "The nation speaks in different tongues and at different times; cases arise where
the determination of 'public policy' must be a distillation of several governmental
utterances." Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, 417 F. Supp. 207, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
77. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
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withdrawn, and that Overseas should cease its performance under the
contract. Shortly thereafter, the Overseas work crew left Egypt upon
indication by United States authorities that their safety was imperiled,
and the Egyptian government's expullsion of most United States citizens following a complete break in diplomatic relations.

RAKTA brought a breach of contract action under an arbitration
agreement contained in the contract. The arbitral tribunal, in a preliminary award, excused part of Overseas' non-performance because of the
force majeure, but later gave a final award to RAKTA for Overseas'
failure to return to Egypt within twenty days following the Arab-Israeli
ceasefire.78 When RAKTA sought to enforce the award in the United
States, Overseas contended that:
[T]he Final Award violated the public policy of the United
States since the Award assessed damages against Overseas,
for failing to complete its contractual services, despite the
fact that Overseas had been ordered to cease performance by
the United States Government. 79

In affirming the rulings in favor of RAKTA, the court found that
Overseas' plea of public policy was easily dismissed under a narrow
construction of the Convention's public policy defense. 80 The equating
of "national policy" with United States "public policy" was considered a mere "parochial device protective of national political interests
[that] would seriously undermine the Convention's utility."'" The court
was sensitive to the possibility of creating a loophole in the Convention
by enshrining "the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of
policy." 82 It would appear that the court sought to avoid standards for
78. Counsel for Overseas asserted that it was still impossible for work crews to
return at that time for three reasons: 1)despite the fact the ceasefire had been signed,
relations were still strained between Egypt and the United States; 2) passport restrictions
on travel in Egypt had not yet been removed; 3) the work crews had been broken up and
scattered throughout the world such that their return was impossible on such short notice.
Counsel also pointed out that Overseas had made good faith efforts to negotiate a
settlement of the matter following the cessation of hostilities. Brief for Appellant at 7-1I,
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier
[RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 16.
80. 508 F.2d at 974. See also text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
81. 508 F.2d at 974.
82. Id.
[I]t is not a general and frequently nebulous policy underlying the public law of
the forum that determines the effect and range of the statute or rule or, to put the
same thing in different words, the limits of public policy. Rather is it [sic] the
intention of the legislator or the common law that is decisive. That intention will
be ascertained by the familiar process of interpretation. In pursuing it regard
will be had not only to the text itself, but also to all other permissible guides such
as the legislative mischief, purpose and history, the limits of legislative jurisdiction and the need for international tolerance and harmony. These are specifically legal considerations. They are peculiar to and worthy of the judicial
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recognition of foreign arbitral awards which would vary according to the
prevailing cordiality of relations between the United States and other
governments.
Although a general national policy in conflict with particular
arbitration results may not constitute a defense to recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, a closer issue of public policy is
raised when a foreign arbitral award is in direct conflict with specific
domestic statutory law.
Even though the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States
Constitution8 3 does not apply to awards recognized by a foreign
sovereign, there is, nevertheless, authority for enforcing awards which
could not have arisen in United States courts. 84 Therefore, a conflict
with domestic law is not a per se violation of public policy. Should a
conflict involve statutory law based on basic notions of morality and
justice, however, it is conceivable that the public policy defense would
be applicable.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,85 the United States Supreme
Court was faced with a conflict between an international commercial
arbitration agreement and unwaiveable protections for investors under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.86 The litigants had agreed to
arbitrate any disputes arising out of their contract. However, when
Alberto-Culver alleged that Scherk had made fraudulent representations
of trademark rights, the Securities Exchange Act became applicable and
prevented the parties from waiving any of the Act's provisions. 87 The
basic question became one of deciding whether the arbitration agreement or the statute would control settlement of the dispute.
The Supreme Court determined that because the arbitration agreement was "truly international," 88 considerations and policies other than
the Securities Exchange Act were involved, namely, the need to avoid
process. They are far removed from what may be described as political rather
than legal policy.
Mann, Conflict of Laws and Public Law, 132 RECUEIL DES COURS 107, 124 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Mann].
83. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 117, Comment c (1971).
85. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). For more extensive discussion of this case, see Case
Comment, Contracts:Arbitration Clausesin InternationalAgreements Held Enforceable,
59 MINN. L. REV. 436 (1974); Recent Decisions, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 467 (1975).
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Ch. 404, § 10b; 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1934); Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5.
87. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
88. 417 U.S. at 515. Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and Boyd v.
Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1919), in which arbitration without international
ramifications was superceded by federal acts.
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uncertainty in a conflict of laws situation, and also potential parochial
action by courts. Together these factors might operate to frustrate the
advantages of arbitration agreements.89 These international considerations were found to outweigh the benefits intended by domestic statutory
protections. 9 The decision to favor international arbitration over
domestic statutory provisions was supported by citing the Convention as
91
an indication of Congressional policy consistent with this ruling.
However, the decision did not use the Convention as primary authority
for its holding. Thus, the Convention public policy defense was not
92
specifically at issue in the majority opinion.
Writing for the dissent, 93 Justice Douglas considered the Convention's public policy defense as a vehicle for holding the domestic statute
94
applicable over international commercial arbitration considerations.
He did not consider the "invocation of the 'international contract'
talisman" as justification for the court's disregard of domestic statutory
protections. 95 He wrote, "If these guarantees are to be removed, it
should take a legislative enactment. I would enforce our laws as they
stand, unless Congress makes an exception. "96
Even after this decision, the respondent in Biotronik Mess-und
Therapiegeraete v. Medford Medical Instrument Co. 97 attempted to
define at least one appropriate instance of the public policy defense by
equating public policy with a federal arbitration statute. The respondent
asserted that the opposing party had committed fraud in the arbitration,
89. 417 U.S. at 515-17.
90. "[T]he mere fact that a statute pursues a certain policy does not indicate that it
sets up so fundamental a principle as to demand its universal application." Mann, supra
note 82, at 130.
91. 417 U.S. at 520-21 n.15.
92. The opinion nevertheless intimated that the question of fraud in the facts may
have been brought under the public policy defense if enforcement of an arbitral award had
been at issue. Id. at 519 n.14.
93. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall concurred in the dissenting opinion.
94. 417 U.S. at 530.
95. Id. at 529.
Neither § 29, [of the Securities Exchange Act] nor the Convention on international arbitration . . .justifies abandonment of a national public policy that
securities claims be heard by a judicial forum simply because some international
elements are involved in a contract.
Id. at 530 n.10, at 531.
96. Id. at 533. But see Fotochrome,Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975)
where the court's decision to allow a foreign arbitral award to be enforced in this country
put United States creditors at a disadvantage to foreign creditors under bankruptcy laws.
The court allowed this exception to the bankruptcy laws without reaching the question of
whether the Bankruptcy Act involved a public policy. Id. at 516.
97. 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
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thereby violating § 10(a) of the United States arbitration act. 98 Consequently, it was argued that:
[S]ince fraudulent procurement of an arbitration award would
be grounds for vacating an award in domestic arbitration
under § 10(a), this is tantamount to a declaration that the
enforcement of any fraudulently obtained [foreign arbitral]
award is contrary to the public policy of the United States. 99
Because the court concluded that there was no fraud involved in the
case, the public policy defense was a fortiori inapplicable, and no
examination of the "most basic notions or morality and justice" was
100
included in the decision.
The pleading of the public policy defense in this case attempted to
utilize the defense as a vehicle for applying domestic arbitration law to
foreign arbitration awards by equating a specific statute with public
policy. Although the court did not reach consideration of this question,
it is clear that the court believed a statutory violation would be insufficient to invoke the public policy defense, absent considerations of basic
notions of morality and justice. This reinforces the principle of Scherk
by holding that the weight given to a statute because it is domestic will
not automatically swing the balance away from recognizing a foreign
arbitral award. 101
98. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1970).
99. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415
F. Supp. 133, 140 (D.N.J. 1976).
100. Id.
101. This judicial attitude was exemplified and extended in the case of Antco
Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Antco, an arbitration
clause in the litigants' contract of affreightment was being challenged because it contained
a phrase which excluded Israel as a port for loading and backhaul voyage. It was claimed
that such an exclusion was illegal as a restrictive boycott upon a friendly country, in
violation of the public policy of the United States as expressed in the federal Export
Regulation Act and § 296 of the New York Executive Law which made illegal any boycotts
which discriminate on the basis of national origin. Antco asserted that this part of the
agreement was done as part of the blacklisting of Israel to "curry favor in the Arab
world." Id. at 209-12, 213. The court refused to take judicial notice of this assertion. Id. at
213.
The court held that public policy was not violated with regard to the Export
Regulation Act because the contract did not involve United States exporters or exports
from the United States, id. at 213; nor was the applicability of the New York Executive
Law sufficiently demonstrated, id. at 217. The court's opinion not only affirmed the
limited definition and narrow construction given the public policy defense in the Overseas
decision, it also went so far as to assert that the Overseas holding was itself a statement of
public policy. Id. at 216.
It should be noted that the matter involved in Antco was a stay of arbitration, whereas
Overseas concerned the enforcement of an arbitral award. The court saw no distinction
between these actions when discussing public policy objections: "While the present case
involves enforcement of the arbitration agreement rather than enforcement of the award,
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For purposes of defining the public policy defense, it appears that
situations in which a foreign arbitral award is in conflict with domestic
statutes may be pleaded under the public policy defense, but the
possibility for success in such a plea appears dubious. No policy yet
argued has outweighed the policy favoring enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. This type of problem included in a defense of public
policy will be subject to the strict construction ennunciated in Overseas.
However, even if a conflict between an arbitral award and domestic law
were pleaded separately from the public policy defense, the holding in
Scherk indicates that deference to international commerce will
require as restricted an application as that presently given to the public
policy defense.
6. Summary. The defenses discussed in the above sections no
longer lend themselves to pleading under the public policy defense. The
procedural due process defense and the non-arbitrable subject matter
defense now are pleaded exclusive of the public policy defense under
separate provisions in the Convention; United States courts accordingly
have considered them apart from the public policy defense. A defense of
"manifest disregard of the law" is unlikely to be a successful public
policy defense because of the difficulties in establishing an arbitrator's
recognition and subsequent disregard of the law, the agreement, and
fundamental rationality. Furthermore, pleading "manifest disregard of
the law" may require a review of the merits of the award, which is
prohibited under domestic law and the Convention. Although it is not
inconceivable that a plea of forum non conveniens may fall within the
boundaries of the public policy defense, a party probably will not plead
inconvenient forum as a public policy matter, for such a plea would have
a more difficult burden of proof under vague Overseas standards of the
most basic notions of morality and justice, than under a test of reasonableness judged in light of particular circumstances. In any event, a
party pleading inconvenient forum must overcome the preference for
enforcement of contract forum-selection provisions which was ennuncomparable questions of public policy arise.
...
Id. at 216. Presumably, the reasoning
behind such an approach concludes that a public policy defense unsuccessfully pleaded in
a motion to stay arbitration will be equally unsuccessful in a challenge to enforcement of a
subsequent arbitral award.
The Supreme Court, however, has drawn the distinction between public policy
considerations in challenges to arbitration clauses, and challenges to enforcement of
arbitral awards. In Scherk, the Court in dealing with a motion to stay arbitration did not
apply the public policy defense, but suggested that it might have been applied to the facts if
enforcement of an arbitral award had been at issue:
Although we do not decide the question, presumably the type of fraud alleged
here could be raised, under Art. V of the Convention, . . . in challenging the
enforcement of whatever arbitral award is produced through arbitration.
417 U.S. at 519 n.14 (emphasis added).
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ciated by the Supreme Court in Bremen. Finally, a foreign arbitral
award even in direct conflict with domestic governmental policies or
statutes does not appear to be a violation of public policy. This is simply
the product of decisive and unmitigated deference by the courts for
international considerations involved in foreign arbitration.
One result of the separation of these defenses from the public
policy defense is the extension of their individual applicability in
reviewing foreign arbitral awards. This extended applicability, in turn,
indicates and emphasizes a greater limitation on the subject matter and
situations to which the public policy defense might be applied.
II.

PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC
POLICY DEFENSE: THE EFFECT UPON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

The federal courts have limited the public policy defense to
considerations of "the forum state's most basic notions of morality and
justice." The purpose of this restricted definition is to limit the bases of
public policy defenses to cardinal segments of lex fori. The problem in
understanding this definitional limitation lies in the fact that all defenses
to enforcement of arbitral awards must ultimately be reflective of basic
notions of justice and morality. Were they not so, they would not be
recognized by the courts. If all defenses to enforcement of arbitral
awards are based on basic notions of morality and justice, how then is
the public policy defense to be distinguished from the others?
Some of the defenses based on basic notions of morality and justice
have evolved independently, and now have their characteristics and
context of application defined to a high degree of specificity, and often
have been given their own labels. The public policy defense is retained
as a "catch-all" to encompass those arbitration situations in which the
basic notions of morality and justice have not yet been specifically
delineated.
The attitude of the United States courts towards the public policy
defense is not one which recognizes the defense as a "catch-all" to
protect the integrity of arbitration. Rather, the courts have considered
the defense mainly as a means by which a forum might escape binding
arbitration. Consequently, the courts have given the public policy
defense so narrow a construction that it now must be characterized as a
defense without meaningful definition. This leaves the defense pragmatically useless if not altogether nonexistent. The public policy
defense suffers conceptually from being an expression of ultimate
sovereign power in international commercial arbitration, which
paradoxically is disfavored by the courts because of its inherently
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss1/5
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provincial and parochial nature. The defense also suffers the pragmatic
weakness of being assigned so unspecific a responsibility as the guarantee of morality and justice. For example, it will not function even to stop
enforcement of an award against a business given because that business
refused to disobey its government's instructions. Such was the case in
Overseas. Even where a foreign arbitral award directly discourages a
party from complying with domestic statutes, such as in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., the public policy defense will not prevent enforcement of the award in the United States. As a result of the conceptual and
pragmatic shortcomings caused by present interpretations of the public
policy defense, it will be difficult for courts, attorneys, arbitrators and
businessmen to anticipate the limits on unfairness surrounding interna02
tional commercial arbitration.'
If the courts, whether by conscious choice or unchallenged reliance
on present authority, continue to deny any use of the public policy
defense in situations where a foreign arbitration award conflicts with
United States law or policy, the use of international commercial
arbitration may mean a significant sacrifice of governmental or statutory
protections. With this possibility in mind, attorneys may consider it
prudent to counsel their clients to avoid an arbitration agreement
altogether, especially if that client is dealing in high risk commercial
situations such as those typically encountered in states which are
unstable or developing. 103 American business may well decide in favor
of choosing the "safety" of United States courts over the advantages of
economy and speed in arbitration. 104
'102. The presumption is made, of course, that definite limits of unfairness are
ascertained and adhered to in our judicial system. But compare the language in Oscanyan
v.Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 277 (1880):
[A] contract to bribe or corruptly influence officers of a foreign government will
not be enforced in the courts of this country,-not from any considerations of
the interests of that government or any regard for its policy, but from the
inherent viciousness of the transaction, its repugnance to our morality, and the
pernicious effect which its enforcement by our courts would have upon our
people.
with Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938) in
which a Jewish plaintiff sued a German corporation that had breached a contract because
of anti-semitic Nazi decrees. The court ruled that it was not competent to review the
actions of the German government in its own territory "however objectionable" it found
the decree.
103. Interview with Malcolm A. Hoffman, Counsel for Overseas in Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L 'Industrie Du Papier[RAKTA1, 508
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (Nov. 7, 1975).
104. It may be argued that American business can simply respond to this situation by
providing as a matter of course for a United States forum for arbitration, but this, in effect,
is a promotion ofthe parochialism that the courts have sought to avoid. "Nor is it always
clear that an MNE [multinational enterprise] will find more favor in its chosen forum."
Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise and Dispute-Resolution Machinery, in NEW
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The unfortunate conclusion that may be anticipated as a result of
present court decisions is that the strict limitations placed on the use of
the public policy defense may actually operate as a deterrent to the use of
international commercial arbitration, rather than the contribution which
the courts intended.
III.

A MODEL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE

Courts have given the public policy defense strict construction and
have circumscribed its use to avoid such problems as a loophole to
enforcement, 105 uncertainty in the arbitral process, 10 6 and destructive
retaliation on American arbitral awards in courts of other states. 107 The
use of the public policy defense in the Federal Republic of Germany, 108
however, illustrates that a less restrained application of public policy
does not necessarily bring about these deleterious consequences.
Germany has relatively progressive policies favoring arbitration, 109 and yet retains a broader interpretation of the public policy
defense than does the United States. Public policy as applied by the
German courts1 10 prevents enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if it
offends good morals or the objectives of German laws, lland especially
if it causes a party to commit an act which is illegal under German
law. 112 The general context for applying public policy is in the
STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 97, 101
(Sanders ed. 1971).
105. See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
106. The United States Supreme Court's concern for "certainty" in arbitration can
be noted in Scherk v. Alberto-CulverCo., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974), and Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
107. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du
Papier [RAKTA], 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (1974); Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete v.
Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J. 1976). See also A.
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1962).
108. The Federal Republic of Germany [hereinafter cited as Germany] acceded to the
Convention in 1961.
109. Schwab, supra note 4, at 303; see generally 2 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF
THE WORLD 76-81 (1971).
110. "German law, following the doctrine of Savigny, regards public policy as an
exception to exclude the operation of the normally applicable rule ..
" Graveson,
ComparativeAspects of the GeneralPrinciplesof PrivateInternationalLaw, 109 RECUEIL
DES COURs 8, 39 (1963). Graveson's analysis characterizes a state's public policy as either
being a "normal operation in decision of conflicts of law cases" or an "exception to the
normal applications of both internal and private international law." Id. at 47. As regards
the use of the public policy defense under the Convention in the United States, it is not
necessary and probably undesirable to take a pre-determined stance on "normal" or
"exceptional" use of public policy. Rather, the use of the public policy defense should be
a reflection of the general validity of the process of arbitration in international commercial
disputes.
111. Id. at 39.
112. German Code of Civil Procedure, ZPO § 1044; Sanders, supra note 12, at 57;
Evans & Ellis, supra note 42, at 46.
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framework of particular circumstances rather than the larger concepts of
"morality" and "justice". 113 This approach encompasses United
States standards of basic notions of morality and justice, and in addition,
provides a practical contextual guideline for applying general standards
of morality and justice to fact situations.
Article 1025(2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure provides
that an arbitration agreement will be declared void if it is the result of a

commercially strong party applying undue influence upon an economically weaker opponent.' 14 A specific statutory delineation of public
policy such as this serves as a general preventative solution to the
potential problems of undue influence and overweening bargaining
power anticipated in the Bremen decision but limited therein to the
issues of forum selection clauses and forum non conveniens.
German law also has a statutory definition of public policy to
prevent its excessive use and to limit its application in a conflict of laws
115
situation to only the cardinal segments of lex fori.
An alternative to a statutory definition of public policy would be a
more developed approach to the language of a statute, both by the
116
If
legislature in drafting and by the judiciary in interpretation.
Congress were to indicate in some fashion those laws which it considers
statements of fundamental public policy in matters involving international commerce, the courts would have less difficulty in resolving
conflicts between foreign arbitration and domestic laws. 117
113. Graveson, supra note 110, at 40.
114. 1 P. SANDERS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39 (1959).
115. ZPO § 1025(2). "[T]he German 'Vorbehaltsklausel'. . . indicates a reservation
or an exception and thereby acts as a brake against excessive use of ordre public." Eek,
PeremptoryNorms and PrivateInternationalLaw, 139 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 21 (1973).
116. The lawmaker, whether the courts or the organs exercising the constitutional legislative power of the State, should make conscious efforts to define the
different categories of legal rules in the field we call private or civil law.
Law-makers are accustomed to make clear whether a rule can or cannot be set
aside by the parties to, for instance, a clearly domestic contract. They might for
good reasons not wish to work out a detailed content of "external public order"
as required for the use of the mechanism of ordre public. But they should make
clear if certain rules or a certain set of rules are meant to apply as "peremptory"
together with the rules of the lex causae which are applicable under the choice
of law rules of the forum. The notion of public order in this sense should not be
left to "the fantasy of individual tribunals".
Id. at 31-32;
It may be assumed that the lack of clear distinctions in legal writing between
ordinary mandatory rules in private law, reprobation of a foreign rule, which is
applicable under the choice of law rules but contrary to the forum's ordre
public, and absolute application of certain rules of law within a given territory
or by the courts of a given country, is a reason why legislators in most countries
do not seem to take much interest in these distinctions.
Id. at 60.
117. The Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. decision may cause some difficulty in this
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A situation in Germany to which a public policy defense has been
analytically applied is in the examination of pre-arbitration agreements
waiving the right to bring suit to vacate an award. 118 A pre-arbitration
agreement waiving appeal of an award appears to be a strong reinforcement of the arbitral process. A deeper analysis, however, reveals that
such agreements would result in awards rendered only under severe
procedural inhibitions.119 On this basis, enforcement of pre-arbitration
agreements waiving appeal of an award is considered violative of public
policy. 120 Application of a public policy defense in this instance does not
emphasize basic notions of morality and justice, as would be required in
United States courts. Nevertheless, public policy would be appropriately invoked in the context of the particular circumstances to preserve the
integrity of arbitral awards. This case is a paradigm example of the
public policy defense being exploited in its "catch-all" capacity, to
correct an undesirable situation which probably would not have been
anticipated by any express enumeration of defenses.
The status of the public policy defense in Germany reflects what
flexible use of this defense can constructively accomplish: certainty as
to governing guidelines of fairness; clarity in the application of laws in
conflict with foreign awards; and effective limitation on the public
policy defense to prevent development of loopholes in binding arbitration without rendering the public policy defense useless. Furthermore,
the success of arbitration in Germany 12 ' demonstrates that a comparatively liberal use of the public policy defense does not result in detriment
to arbitration as a means of dispute settlement or create a threat of
unfortunate reciprocation by other states.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The public policy defense has been criticized as a blind, nondiscriminating substitute for analysis.' 22 The almost mechanical rejection
of the public policy defense by United States courts, however, reflects a
similar lack of analysis.
regard. The statute involved in that matter stated unequivocally that its provisions could
not be waived by condition, stipulation or provision, yet the Court did not recognize this
strong language as an express statement of public policy.
118. Schwab, supra note 4, at 310.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 303.
122. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969,
982, 987, 1016 (1956).
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Courts that seek to promote international commercial arbitration
should be cognizant of the possibility that the present tenor of decisions
on the public policy defense may actually be a deterrent to the use of
arbitration. The problems resulting from present judicial interpretations
of the public policy defense indicate a need for a more analytic
evaluation of the defense of public policy. The role of the public policy
defense in German arbitration suggests that a more flexible use of the
public policy defense in the United States could contribute to the
integrity of the arbitral process without creating loopholes in the
Convention or destructive reciprocation by courts in other countries.
The public policy defense would become more meaningful if its
potential utility were emphasized as much as its potential abuse. Parties
to arbitration have a good faith duty not to use the public policy defense
as a dilatory or evasive action following an award. 123 Similarly, they
should not allege the public policy defense as a proforma pleading in a
defense to enforcement of an award, for meaningless use of the public
policy defense would serve only to distract a court from analysis of
substantive public policy considerations.
Courts should view the public policy defense not merely as an
expression of parochialism in international commercial conflicts, but
also as an ultimate guarantee of fairness and integrity in international
commercial dispute resolution. Courts should be equally sensitive to
particular circumstances of a dispute as well as basic notions of morality
and justice in order to give more depth and meaning to their analyses.
Their language should reflect an analytic approach to application of
public policy instead of mere general assertions about basic morality and
justice that provide no prescriptive direction for future arbitration.
United States courts should consider re-evaluating the present interpretation of the public policy defense in order to bring their focus into line
with the constructive purposes of the public policy defense and the
positive effect it is intended to have on international commercial
arbitration.
Joel R. Junker

123. South East Atlantic Shipping, Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., 356 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.
1966).
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